Part 26 of 26 -- Afterword

This is the twenty-sixth and last installment of a series (see the first installment here) summarizing the 1994 book Dream City: Race, Power, and the Decline of Washington, D.C.by Harry Jaffe and Tom Sherwood. This book has recently been republished as an ebook and a paper book. HBO has plans to use material from the book to make a movie about the life of Marion Barry.

Afterword (four of four)

The last part of this book describes the rise of Mayor Vincent C. Gray up until April 2014, when it went to press.

“[Gray] grew up in a one-bedroom apartment in Northeast Washington.... His partents never attended high school. Gray graduated Dunbar High School... and went on to George Washington University.... After graduating college, Gray went into social work, first for senior citizens, later for people with developmental disabilities” (Kindle location 6363).

“Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly appointed Gray to run her human-services department in 1991. When she lost reelection in 1994, Gray became executive director of Covenant House, an organiation that served the homeless and at-risk children. He ran it for a decade” (l. 6364).

“In 2004, at the age of 62, Vince Gray won the Ward Seven seat on the council... Just two years later in 2006, Gray ran citywide for council chairman and won.... He was deliberate, patient, collegial – all qualities that helped the 13-member legislative group function well. He watched the new Mayor Fenty treat the council with indifference” (l. 6364).

“Members of the 'old guard' lobbied Gray and promised to raise funds for his campaign.... Polls showed Gray could challenge Fenty. In March the council chairman declared his candidacy for mayor; a month later Fenty officially entered the race” (l. 6375).

“On quality of life and civic accomplishments, Mayor Fenty could run on a solid record. The city was safer. Crime was down. Homocides had fallen to 140 in 2009, a 45-year low. District agencies were running more efficiently.... Residents said in polls that the city was headed in the right direction” (l. 6377).

“But Fenty could not shake the widespread impression that he was arrogant and insensitive. He refused to accept polls that showed his popularity in free fall” (l. 6377).

“An undercurrent theme in the campaign to unseat Fenty was that Gray would resurrect Marion Barry's power base, bring back his machine, and redirect the flow of city contracts to Barry's friends. Fenty had tossed many old-guard Washingtonians from his government and from city contracts. Encouraged by Barry, they wanted back in” (l. 6402).

“In the decisive Democratic primary on September 14, Vince Gray trounced Fenty with 54 percent of the vote to Fenty's 44 percent. The city cleaved along racial lines: In black precincts across Anacostia in Ward Seven, Gray polled 82 percent of the vote. Fenty got 80 percent of the mostly white votes in Ward Three” (l. 6404).

“Mayor Vincent Gray was in office for fewer than two months when more than a few voters experienced an extreme case of buyer's remorse” (l. 6415).

“Gray had run as the clean candidate – 'Character, Integrity, Leadership' – and promised high ethical standards and a more approachable city government than Fenty had run. Gray had barely moved into the executive suite when news broke that his appointees and staff in top jobs in his administration were busy installing dozens of family members and friends in other posts with high salaries” (l. 6416).

Sulaimon Brown had run against both Fenty and Gray for mayor, but spent much of his time on the campaign trail attacking Fenty. Brown then got a $110,000-a-year job in the Gray administation. 

“When his past legal problems surfaced in the news, Brown was fired and escorted his office by police” (l. 6421).

Brown accused the mayor of paying him to attack Fenty.

“The mayor and his campaign advisors scoffed. Gray hastily called a news conference and called for an investigation to clear his administration's name. But Brown produced documents, money order receipts, and phone records to help prove his account” (l. 6427).

"When Gray could rise above the fray, he governed well..." (l. 6432).

"His economic-development aides helped jumpstart projects that had been in the planning stages during the Williams and Fenty administrations. Construction cranes once again defined the District's skyline. Gray cut ribbons for the long-stalled Skyland shopping center in Ward Seven; new shops, offices, and housing at the O Street Market site along 9th Street, Northwest; and a total redevelopment of the Southwest waterfront along Maine Avenue" (l. 6444).

"... Young couples pushing baby strollers began showing up in traditionally African American neighborhoods like Petworth along Georgia Avenue. Newcomers moved into row houses in Bloomingdale and Eckington, east of North Capital Street" (l. 6540).

"Nowhere was the revival more evident than on 14th Street north of downtown. The eight blocks from Massachusetts Avenue to U Street became famous -- and infamous -- for redevelopment and gentrification. Developers knocked down warehouses and replaced them with condominiums. The Central Union Mission, which had housed homeless people for decades at 14th and R Streets, sold its building and moved to another location...." (l. 6543).

"The city's revival failed to lift all boats: The District's poor residents suffered from unemployment, poor health, and violent crime, especially if they lived east of the Anacostia" (l. 6552).

"The first polls in the mayor's race showed Gray with a lead, thanks to his base in the black wards east of the Anacostia River and a field jammed with challengers...." (l. 6579)

Meanwhile, corruption investigations that had been picking off members of the Grey administration closed in.

"On March 10, three weeks before the election, [businessman and Gray confidant] Jeff Thompson pleaded guilty to violating campaign-finance laws. Among many admissions, he said he had paid former councilmember Michael Brown to drop out of the 2006 mayor's race and endorse Linda Cropp against Adrian Fenty. He admitted to funneling more than $2-million in illegal contributions to local and federal campaigns over a six-year period. His pleas detailed how he had raised and directed more than $650,000 for Gray's 2010 election" (l. 6591).

"The blockbuster: In open court, Thompson alleged that Vincent Gray knew of the illegal contributions. Vernon Hawkins and other Gray aides had asked Thompson for $400,000 to help Gray get out the vote" (l. 6592).

"Mayor Gray needed to rally his base in the black wards. He never had much support among white voters, who pined for Fenty... and assumed Gray knew of the corrupt campaign" (l. 6594).

"Whom was he going to call? Marion Barry" (l. 6603).

"On Wednesday, March 19, Barry showed up in the basement of Matthews Memorial Baptist Church in Anacostia to endorse Gray's reelection bid. He had to help helped onto the stage" (l. 6604).


"The weekend before the April 1 vote, Barry joined a caravan through African American wards. Riding shotgun, Barry used a megaphone to exhort voters to turn out for Grey" (l. 6617).

"[Muriel] Bowser won the April 1st primary decisively. She captured 44 percent of the vote to Gray's 32 percent" (l. 6618).

"Few voters showed up citywide to vote on April 1. The 83,000 votes cast represented the lowest turnout in nearly 30 years. Precious few showed up in the black precincts Gray needed to win. While half of the voters turned out in some white precincts, fewer than 10 percent bothered to vote in black precincts along the Prince Georges County line" (l. 6621).

"Gray had failed to assume the cloak of victimhood that Barry tried to pass to him. In his first campaign defeating Fenty, Grey had received more than 25,000 votes east of the Anacostia. In the new election, despite Barry, Grey got fewer than 9,000 votes" (l. 6624).

"At the Democratic Unity Breakfast a few days after the election, Gray had to be goaded into shaking Bowser's hand" (l. 6629).

The chapter ends with a brief portrait of David Catania and the threat his campaign might pose to Muriel Bowser. At the time of the writing, Carol Schwartz had not announced her candidacy.

The books ends with a nod to its subject, Marion Barry.

"Marion Barry showed up in a wheelchair at Grey's election-night party. He said it was time for city voters to rally against Catania. Barry, the survivor, endorsed Bowser" (l. 6641).

Cheater's Guide to Dream City ends

There was a lot of fascinating detail in this book which I left out of this summary. If you want to understand the local politics of DC, you must read this a great book in its entirety.


RIP Marion Barry -- read the Washington Post Obituary here

Part 25 -- Afterword

This is the twenty-fifth installment of a series (see the first installment here) summarizing the 1994 book Dream City: Race, Power, and the Decline of Washington, D.C.by Harry Jaffe and Tom Sherwood. This book has recently been republished as an ebook and a paper book. HBO has plans to use material from the book to make a movie about the life of Marion Barry.

Afterword (three of four)

"When Mayor [Anthony] Williams announced in September 2005 that he would not seek a third term, DC Council chairman Linda Cropp seemed to be his natural council success" (Kindle locaton 6202).

But Adrian Fenty, DC council member from Ward Four, had other ideas.

"To Fenty, Cropp was another standard-bearer for the city's old guard, the people who had failed to govern his native city for decades, going back to Marion Barry" (l. 6203).

"From the start, Fenty's campaign focused on contrasts -- youth against experience, change versus the status quo" (l. 6204)

Fenty grew up in Mt. Pleasant, where he worked in his parents' running-gear store. He graduated from Howard University Law School, interned for several members of Congress, and was a staff for a city councilmember before successfully running for DC council himself.

"On the council for six years, Fenty made few friends among his colleagues. He devoted his time and his staff's to constituent services. No street light, trashy alley, or dispute with the city escaped their attention. With two Blackberries connecting him to staff and the streets, he patrolled his realm in upper Northwest DC along 16th Street and Georgia Avenue in a white Suburban. He was executive rather than collegial. His council colleagues neither knew nor respected him. Fenty didn't care. He was looking past them all" (l. 6224).

"Fenty began running for mayor in June 2005 at age 35. He set a goal of walking every street and knocking on every door, and by the height of the campaign in the fall of 2006, he had come close" (l. 6226).

 "In the Democratic primary that September, Fenty trounced Cropp in all eight wards, 57 percent to 31 percent, carrying every one of the city's 142 precincts. That had never been done before. Fenty had swept the field in a city long divided along racial and class lines" (l. 6228).

"...The mayor-elect scanned the nation for talent. To run his planning office, he hired Harriet Tregoning, a leader in smart growth and urban planning. As police chief, he appointed Cathy Lanier, the first woman to run the high-profile force. Fenty knew Lanier from her days commanding cops in his ward.... Fenty installed Allen Lew to run the massive school-reconstruction operation. Lew had managed construction of the new convention center and the new baseball stadium" (l. 6250).

Fenty also appointed Michelle Rhee to be the District's first school chancellor.

"In her first five months on the job, Rhee met with 144 principals and fired two on the spot" (l. 6290).

"Rhee, 38, brought in allies from the reform movement. Kaya Henderson become her chief deputy. Working for Rhee's New Teacher Project out of New York, Henderson deep into city schools and its tough battles with the Washington teachers union. Abigail "Abby" Smith joined the reform team along with a phalanx of other Rhee acolytes" (l. 6300).

"Beyond the nation's capital, Michelle Rhee became a new breed of celebrity: an 'edu-celeb'. Educators rarely show up on the covers of national news magazines. Michelle Rhee broke the mold. Time magazine featured a stern Rhee on its cover holding a broom, the better to clean up the schools" (l. 6302).

"But within the District, Rhee was piling up enemies, especially among the teachers and some parents groups. Every school she closed wounded a neighborhood and forced students to travel to class. Many teachers were middle-class African American women who served as backbones of families and communities. Firing a teacher who didn't measure up could disrupt an entire neighborhood" (l. 6313).

"Fenty's popularity sank, but the damage came more from self-inflicted wounds than from Rhee's reforms" (l. 6315).

"Fenty never warmed to the bare-minimum political practice of cultivating firends, let alone disarming enemies. Idle chats with voters bored him. He didn't like attending civic functions. If he showed up at a Chamber of Commerce reception, he arrived late and left early. He treated other business groups the same way -- with the back of his hand" (l. 6322).

Fenty appointed personal friends with no experience to political positions and picked fights with members of the DC council.

"Fenty's image also suffered when it seemed he was spending more time training for triathlons than running the city. WTOP reporter Mark Segraves caught him using police escorts to guide his cycling runs through Rock Creek Park and other heavily traveled parkways. Segraves' cell phone video became a hit on the station's website. It didn't help when Fenty scheduled a trip to Dubai without disclosing either his plans or who paid for the travel, as required by law" (l. 6347).

"A poll conducted by the Washington Post in January 2010 showed Fenty's approval ratings had plummeted, especially among black Washingtonians. African Americans switched from 68-percent approval after his first year in office to 65-percent disapproval, according the poll. Citywide, 49 percent of residents disapprove of his performance as mayor" (l. 6352).

"Nevertheless, Fenty started raising money for a second term in the summer of 2009, amassing a war chest of more than $4 million. He left crumbs on the table for a challenger. It looked as though he would run unopposed" (l. 6353).

Cheater's Guide to Dream City continues

All posts are cross-posted on Short Articles about Long Meetings.

Full disclosure: I have a commercial relationship with Amazon. I will receive a very small portion of the money people spend after clicking on an Amazon link on this site.

This is a great book and well worth reading in its entirety.

Read the next installment here.

Part 24 -- Afterword

This is the twenty-fourth installment of a series (see the first installment here) summarizing the 1994 book Dream City: Race, Power, and the Decline of Washington, D.C.by Harry Jaffe and Tom Sherwood. This book has recently been republished as an ebook and a paper book. HBO has plans to use material from the book to make a movie about the life of Marion Barry.

Afterword (two of four) 

Anthony Williams served two terms as mayor, from 1999 to 2007.
"Mayor Tony Williams governed quietly and without fanfare. He was the anti-Barry, boring but competent” (Kindle location 6031).

“[H]e made the District balance its book. He lured competent bureaucrats to run city agencies” (l. 6036).

“When Williams became mayor, five of the city's social-services agencies were in receivership or under court ordered management. One by one, he gradually brought them back under District control” (l. 6040).

“If Williams had a weakness, it was his disdain for the rituals of politics. Where Barry had nurtured his network in the neighborhoods and sensed every shift in sentiment, Williams was removed and remained tone deaf” (l. 6059).

“... Williams proposed cutting the city work force and farming out government functions to private companies. City Union leaders howled. Williams seemed surprised” (l. 6069).

“I didn't get elected to adjust the air-conditioning,” Williams said.

“Williams and his top assistants assembled lower-level line employees in the convention center. They held seminars to teach them how to answer phones and perform routine public-service tasks. Williams did what Marion Barrt had failed to do: he trained the work force. For city government, it was nothing less than revolutionary” (l. 6078).

 “... After four consecutive balanced budgets, in September 2001, the federal financial control board suspended its activities and put the city's government and budget back in the hands of the mayor and the council” (l. 6092).

“... [W]hen [Williams] ran for reelection in 2002, his campaign failed to collect the required number of valid signatures to place him in the ballot. He needed only 2,000. TV reporters with NBC4 found that half of the signatures the Williams campaign turned in were fake. The Board of Elections ruled Williams ineligible for the ballot and fined his campaign $250,000” (l. 6093).

“Williams had to run as a write in candidate. Still, he won. His success at reforming the government overcame his political ineptitude” (l. 6096).

Williams' success at improving city finances drew the approval and attention of investors in many fields, including Major League Baseball. “Williams wanted a team, but Jack Evans craved one. The Ward Two council member had been coveting a franchise since 1996... As chair of the [DC City-] council finance and revenue committee, Evans played a crucial role in lobbying MLB owners and persuading the council to pay for a new stadium with public funds" (l. 6139).

"It took three more contentious months to convince the DC council to agree to finance the new stadium.... Critics argued that the estimated $500-million in bonds would be better devoted to more pressing needs" (l. 6140).

" 'Why can't the team owners pay their fair share?' asked Adrian Fenty, the upstart young Ward Four council member. "No, voting against the stadium doesn't mean money will automatically go to schools and other needs. But it does mean that a government that does not get those things right should not be exploring putting hundreds of millions of dollars into the pockets of multi-millionaires" (l. 6141).

"Politically, landing the team was a win for Williams and Evans. But Adrian Fenty, the lawmaker who said 'no' to public financing, got his first dose of notoriety. It would not be his last" (l. 6143).

"[A]fter eight years with Williams at the helm, the city was better off in measurable ways. He valued competence in the bureaucracies, trained workers, and expected accountability. Trash got picked up. The motor-vehicle department actually issued licenses without making residents reserve a day to wait in line. City workers were less surly and more willing to serve the public. In short, Williams reformed the city government. He organized its finances. And he balanced the budget every year" (l. 6199).

"By 2006, local Washington had the feel of a metropolitan center poised to hit is stride as an international capital" (l. 6200).

Cheater's Guide to Dream City continues

All posts are cross-posted on Short Articles about Long Meetings.

Full disclosure: I have a commercial relationship with Amazon. I will receive a very small portion of the money people spend after clicking on an Amazon link on this site.

This is a great book and well worth reading in its entirety.

Read the next installment here.